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FLORIDA PREPAID POST-SECONDARY EDUC. EXPENSE BD. V. 
COLLEGE SAV. BANK AND THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 
119 S. CT. 2199 (1999) 
I. INTRODUCTION 
By striking down the Patent Remedy Act1 (“PRA”) as an unconstitutional 
abrogation of states’ rights by Congress, the Supreme Court has severely 
limited Congress’s power to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment due process 
clause.2  The Court has required that all future legislation be remedial, as 
opposed to preventive.  Thus, the Court has chosen to bolster states’ rights to 
sovereign immunity under the Eleventh Amendment3 at the expense of 
individuals’ property rights and their right to due process under the Fourteenth 
Amendment.  The holding in Florida Prepaid Post-Secondary Educ. Expense 
Bd. v. College Sav. Bank4 (“FPP”) will have long-reaching affects on 
individuals’ property rights and their right to due process.  Not only does the 
Court fail to pay any deference to Congress, but it also sets forth a new 
requirement that Congress identify a “pattern” of constitutional violations 
before it may enact appropriate legislation pursuant to its Fourteenth 
Amendment enforcement powers.  After FPP, patent owners may have their 
patents infringed by States without any due process.5  No patent owner can sue 
a state in federal court without the state’s express consent.6  For those states 
that do provide state remedies, due process is often found to be merely 
illusory.7 
This Note will first summarize the history and identify recent 
developments in the area of law surrounding Eleventh Amendment sovereign 
immunity rights of states and the Fourteenth Amendment rights of individuals 
to due process.  It will then discuss the majority and dissenting opinions in 
FPP.  Finally, this Note will examine the implications FPP will have on 
 
 1. Patent Remedy Act, Pub. L. No. 102-560, 106 Stat. 4230 (1994) (codified as amended at 
35 U.S.C. § 271(h) (1994)) [hereinafter PRA]. 
 2. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. 
 3. U.S. CONST. amend. XI. 
 4. Florida Prepaid Post-Secondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. College Sav. Bank, 119 S. Ct. 
2199, 2214 (1999). 
 5. Id. 
 6. Id. 
 7. Id. 
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Congress’s power to enact appropriate legislation under section five of the 
Fourteenth Amendment.  Congress should not be required to identify a pattern 
of constitutional violations as a prerequisite to enacting appropriate legislation 
under section five of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
II. BACKGROUND (DEVELOPMENT OF LAW) 
A. Sovereign Immunity - Eleventh Amendment 
The Eleventh Amendment states:  “[t]he Judicial Power of the United 
States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced 
or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or 
by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.”8  In Hans v. Louisiana, the Court 
held that:  (1) each state is a Sovereign entity in our federal system; and (2) it is 
inherent in the nature of sovereignty not to be amenable to the suit of an 
individual without its consent.9  Over the past century, the Supreme Court has 
continually redefined the scope of Congress’s power to limit states’ Eleventh 
Amendment sovereign immunity.  The Court often failed to reach a consensus 
on its interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment.10  Currently, the Court does 
acknowledge that:  (1) a state may “expressly” waive its Eleventh Amendment 
sovereign immunity;11 and (2) Congress may in limited situations, after finding 
a pattern of constitutional violations, enact legislation to abrogate states’ 
sovereign immunity.12 
B. Implied Waiver By a State of Its Sovereign Immunity 
In Parden, the Court established the “constructive waiver doctrine” 
holding that by participating in interstate commerce a State constructively 
waives its sovereign immunity.13  However, the “constructive waiver doctrine” 
 
 8. U.S. CONST. amend. XI. 
 9. Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890). 
 10. See, e.g., Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1, 3 (1989) (plurality opinion), 
overruled by Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 66 (1996) (5-4 decision); 
Dellmuth v. Muth, 491 U.S. 223, 224 (1989) (5-4 decision); Parden v. Terminal Ry. of Ala. 
Docks Dep’t, 377 U.S. 184, 198 (1964) (5-4 decision), overruled by Welch v. Texas Dep’t of 
Highways & Pub. Trans., 483 U.S. 468 (1987) (plurality opinion); Atascadero State Hosp. v. 
Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 235 (1985) (5-4 decision). 
 11. College Sav. Bank, 119 S. Ct. 2219, 2226 (1999) (companion case filed on same date).  
The Court will generally find a waiver if the State makes a “clear declaration” that it intends to 
submit itself to Federal Jurisdiction.  Id. 
 12. See generally id. 
 13. Parden, 377 U.S. at 184.  The Court permitted employees of a railroad owned and 
operated by Alabama to bring action under the Federal Employers’ Liability Act (“FELA”) 
against their employer in federal court.  Despite the absence of any provision in the statute 
specifically referring to the States, the Court held the Act authorized suits against States by virtue 
of a general provision subjecting to suit “every common carrier by railroad . . . engaging in 
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announced in Parden has been expressly overruled by the companion case  
Florida Prepaid Post-Secondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. College Sav. Bank 
(“FPP’s Companion Case”).14  In FPP’s Companion Case, the Court held 
there was a fundamental difference between a state expressing unequivocally 
that it waives its sovereign immunity, and Congress expressing its intention 
that if a state takes certain action it will be deemed to have waived that 
immunity.15   After FPP’s Companion Case, Congress may not require a state 
to constructively waive its sovereign immunity merely by participating in 
regulated activities such as interstate commerce or advertising.16  But, a State 
may still voluntarily waive its sovereign immunity by an unequivocal 
statement of such intent.17 
The four Justice dissent, in FPP’s Companion Case, is persuaded that a 
state, such as Florida, engaged in interstate advertising of its products should 
be deemed to have waived any defense of sovereign immunity in patent 
litigation.18  When a state engages in commercial ventures that fall outside its 
basic governmental obligation, the dissent believes that Congress must have 
the power to require the state to waive its immunity to suit in federal court.19  
The dissent asserts that the lack of such authority by Congress would create an 
enforcement gap, that when combined with the pressures of a competitive 
marketplace, could put the state’s regulated private competitors at a significant 
disadvantage.20 
 
commerce . . . between the States,” 45 U.S.C. § 51 (1940).  The Court further held that Alabama 
had waived its immunity despite the fact that Alabama law disavowed any such suit.  Parden, 377 
U.S. at 184. 
 14. College Sav. Bank, 119 S. Ct. at 2228.  The Trademark Remedy Clarification Act 
(TRCA) (see 15 U.S.C. § 1125 (1998)) subjects states to suits brought under section 43(a) of the 
Trademark Act of 1946 for false and misleading advertising.  In FPP’s Companion Case, 
petitioner filed suit claiming the respondent violated section 43(a) by misrepresenting its tuition 
repayment program.  Petitioner claimed that Florida waived its immunity by participating in 
interstate marketing and administration of its program after the TRCA made it clear that such 
activity would subject it to suit.  The Court held a state does note constructively waive sovereign 
immunity by participating in interstate commerce.  Id. 
 15. Id. 
 16. See generally id. 
 17. Id. at 2233. 
 18. Id. at 2233-34.  Justice Breyer filed a dissenting opinion in which Justices Stevens, 
Souter, and Ginsburg joined.  The Dissent would not abandon the Constructive Waiver Doctrine.  
If a State engages in activity from which it might readily withdraw, such as federally regulated 
commercial activity, Congress should have the power to require the State to waive its immunity 
from suit in federal court.  Id. 
 19. Id. at 2235.  When a State engages in commercial ventures, it acts like a private person, 
outside the area of its core duties.  It is unlikely that these non-core activities will prove essential 
to the fulfillment of a basic governmental obligation.  Id. 
 20. Id. at 2235. 
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C. Congress’s Power to Abrogate State Sovereign Immunity 
1. Article One “Commerce Clause Power” 
In Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co.,21 the Court held that Congress had the 
power to abrogate state sovereign immunity under both its Article One 
“Commerce Clause” power22 and its enforcement power of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.23  In Union Gas, a coal plant worker, brought suit against 
Pennsylvania for a negligent discharge of hazardous waste into the creek, 
asserting that the state was liable for clean up costs.24  In response, the state 
claimed that it was immune from liability under the Eleventh Amendment.25  
The four Justice plurality reasoned:  (1) the rationale of a decision reaching a 
similar result with regard to legislation under section five of the Constitution’s 
Fourteenth Amendment is equally applicable to the “Commerce Clause,” since 
both constitutional provisions are plenary grants of authority expanding federal 
power while restricting state power; and (2) to the extent that the states gave 
Congress the authority to regulate commerce, they relinquished their immunity 
and consented to suit where Congress finds it necessary.26 
However, Congress’s expanded authority under its Article One 
“Commerce Clause” power did not last long.  In Seminole Tribe, the Court 
expressly overruled Union Gas and held that Congress could not abrogate the 
sovereign immunity of the states when acting pursuant to its plenary power to 
regulate commerce under Article One of the Constitution.27  The Court 
reasoned that it could not interpret its decision in Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer28 to 
 
 21. 491 U.S. 1 (1989). 
 22. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (“The Congress shall have the Power. . . to regulate 
Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes.”). 
 23. Union Gas, 491 U.S. at 1.  A four Justice plurality expressed the view that Congress has 
the authority to render States liable in money damages in federal court when legislating pursuant 
to the Constitution’s commerce clause.  Union Gas, 491 U.S. at 14. 
 24. Union Gas, 491 U.S. at 3.  The coal plant worker brought suit under the Comprehensive 
Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980 (“CERCLA”) (42 U.S.C. §§ 
9604-07 (Law. Co-op. 1980)) and the Super-fund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986 
(“SARA”) (100 Stat. 1613 (1986)) that imposed liability on site owners and operators for 
hazardous waste release.  Both statutes were enacted by Congress pursuant to its Article One 
commerce clause power.  Union Gas, 491 U.S. at 4. 
 25. Union Gas, 491 U.S. at 5. 
 26. Id. 
 27. Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 44.  In a five to four decision, the Court held that Congress 
had no authority to abrogate states’ sovereign immunity under its Article One commerce clause 
power. The Court struck down the Indian Gambling Regulatory Act (“IGRA”) (18 U.S.C. § 2701 
(1988)) which Congress enacted pursuant to its authority under the Indian Commerce Clause.  
The IGRA gave Indian Tribes the power to sue states in federal courts.  Id. 
 28. 427 U.S. 445 (1976). 
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justify limiting state immunity under provisions such as the Commerce Clause 
that pre-dated the ratification of the Eleventh Amendment.29 
2. Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 
The Fourteenth Amendment provides in relevant part: “[s]ection 1. . .No 
state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or 
immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any 
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any 
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”; “[s]ection 
5. . .The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the 
provisions of this article.”30 
In Fitzpatrick,31 the Court held that section five of the Fourteenth 
Amendment empowered Congress to enforce the amendment by appropriate 
legislation, including the power to abrogate states’ Eleventh Amendment 
sovereign immunity.32  The Court reasoned that the prohibitions of the 
Fourteenth Amendment are directed at the states, thereby expanding federal 
authority while limiting states’ powers.33 
Several cases between 1985 and 1990 placed an additional requirement on 
Congress to express unequivocally its intention to abrogate sovereign 
immunity when enacting legislation pursuant to its authority under the 
Fourteenth Amendment.34  In Chew v. California, an inventor from Ohio 
attempted to sue California for patent infringement.35  Applying the Courts 
decision in Scanlon,36 the Federal Circuit in Chew held that federal patent laws 
failed to contain the requisite statement of unmistakably clear intent required to 
abrogate state sovereign immunity in infringement suits.37 
 
 29. Id.  See also Kristen Healey, Comment: The Scope of Eleventh Amendment Immunity 
from Suits Arising Under Patent Law After Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 47 AM. U. L. REV. 1735, 
1751-52 (1998). 
 30. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. 
 31. 427 U.S. 445 (1976). 
 32. Id.  A class action suit was brought on behalf of all present and retired males in the state 
of Connecticut, claiming discrimination in the state’s retirement benefit plan.  The suit claimed 
the discriminatory retirement plan was in violation of the 1972 Amendments to Title VII of the 
Civil Rights Act of 1964.  The Court held that Congress did possess authority pursuant to the 
Fourteenth Amendment to subject states to suit in federal court.  Id. 
 33. Id. 
 34. See generally Chew v. California, 893 F.2d 331 (Fed. Cir. 1990); Scanlon, 473 U.S. at 
244-43; Dellmuth, 492 U.S. at 223. 
 35. Chew, 892 F.2d at 332-33.  See generally 35 U.S.C. §§ 1 – 296 (1994) (dealing with the 
patent laws). 
 36. 473 U.S. at 243-244 (holding that “Congress must express its intention to abrogate the 
Eleventh Amendment in unmistakable language in the statute itself”). 
 37. Chew, 892 F.2d at 334.  The Court required Congress to express its intention to abrogate 
sovereign immunity in unmistakably clear language in the statute itself.  Id. 
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D. Federal Statute – Patent Remedy Act (PRA) 
In response to Chew, Congress amended the patent laws to express its 
“unmistakably clear” intent to abrogate the sovereign immunity of the states.38  
Section 271(h) of the PRA now states: “[a]s used in this section, the term 
‘whoever’ includes any State, any instrumentality of a State, and any officer or 
employee of a State or instrumentality of a State acting in his official 
capacity.”39  Section 296(a) addresses the sovereign immunity issue even more 
specifically:  “[a]ny State, any instrumentality of a State, and any officer or 
executive of a State or instrumentality of a State acting in his official capacity, 
shall not be immune, under the Eleventh Amendment of the Constitution . . ., 
from suit in federal court.”40 
III. FLORIDA PREPAID POST-SECONDARY EDUC. EXPENSE BD. V. COLLEGE 
SAV. BANK 
A. Summary Of Facts 
College Savings Bank (“CSB”) is a New Jersey chartered savings bank 
located in Princeton, New Jersey.41  Since 1987, CSB has sold certificates of 
deposit contracts known as College Sure® CDs.42  The purpose of the College 
Sure® CD is to help individuals save money for the unknown cost of college 
education expenses.43  CSB guarantees returns sufficient to fund the uncertain 
future cost of education.44  The College Sure® CD is administered using an 
apparatus and methods disclosed in College Savings’ U.S. Patent No. 
4,722,055, entitled “Method and Apparatus for funding Liability of Uncertain 
Costs.”45 
The Florida Prepaid Post-Secondary Education Expense Board (“Florida 
Board”), a corporate body of the State of Florida, administers a similar 
investment program aimed at aiding individuals fund the cost of Florida public 
colleges and universities.46  CSB claims that the Florida Board directly and 
indirectly infringed on CSB’s patent.47 
 
 38. See College Sav. Bank, 119 S. Ct. at 2203. 
 39. 35 U.S.C. § 271(h) (1994). 
 40. 35 U.S.C. § 296(a) (1994). 
 41. College Sav. Bank v. Florida Prepaid Post-Secondary Educ. Expense Bd., 948 F. Supp. 
400, 401 (D.N.J. 1996). 
 42. Id. 
 43. Id. 
 44. Id. 
 45. Id. 
 46. College Sav. Bank, 948 F. Supp. at 401. 
 47. Id. 
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CSB brought an infringement action against the Florida Board in United 
States District Court for the District of New Jersey pursuant to the PRA,48 
which explicitly provides that states may be sued for patent infringement in the 
federal courts.49  The Florida Board moved to dismiss CSB’s claim as barred 
by Eleventh Amendment state sovereign immunity.50  The Florida Board 
asserted that the PRA was an unconstitutional attempt by congress to use its 
Article One powers, under the Patent Clause,51 to abrogate state sovereign 
immunity and to expand the federal courts’ Article III jurisdiction.52  CSB 
argued that the PRA was properly enacted by Congress pursuant to its 
enforcement power under section five of the Fourteenth Amendment.53  The 
United States intervened as of right,54 to defend the constitutionality of the 
PRA. 
B. District Court Opinion 
The District Court upheld the PRA, stating it was a valid exercise of 
congressional power under the Fourteenth Amendment to abrogate state 
sovereign immunity.55  In addition, the District Court held that:  (1) the Florida 
Board did not waive its Eleventh Amendment immunity by engaging in 
interstate marketing and administration of its investment contracts; and (2) 
Congress could not abrogate state sovereign immunity on Lanham Act 
claims.56 
The District Court reasoned Congress met both the requirements set forth 
in Seminole Tribe,57 first, Congress has unequivocally expressed its intent to 
abrogate immunity; and second, Congress had acted pursuant to a valid 
exercise of power.58  The court found that Congress had revised the PRA to 
make its intention to abrogate states’ sovereign immunity unmistakably clear, 
and that the Fourteenth Amendment authorized Congress to protect against 
state infringement of patent rights without due process.59 
 
 48. 35 U.S.C. §§ 271(h), 296 (1994). 
 49. College Sav. Bank v. Florida Prepaid Post-Secondary Educ. Expense Bd., 148 F.3d 
1343, 1346 (Fed. Cir. 1998). 
 50. Id. 
 51. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
 52. College Sav. Bank, 148 F.3d at 1346.  See also U.S. CONST. art. III. 
 53. Id. 
 54. See 28 U.S.C. § 2403(a) (1994). 
 55. College Sav. Bank, 148 F.3d at 1346. 
 56. Id. 
 57. 116 S. Ct. at 1123. 
 58. College Sav. Bank, 948 F. Supp. at 420. 
 59. Id. at 421-22. 
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C. Federal Circuit Court Opinion 
The Federal Circuit Court affirmed the District Court’s decision denying 
the Florida Board’s motion to dismiss the claim as barred by the Eleventh 
Amendment.60  The Circuit Court held that Congress unmistakably expressed 
its intent to abrogate state sovereign immunity for patent infringement suits 
brought in the federal court pursuant to its authority under section five of the 
Fourteenth Amendment.61  The Circuit Court did not address CSB’s arguments 
that the Florida Board waived its sovereign immunity either by failing to raise 
the sovereign immunity defense earlier in litigation or by participating in the 
patent system.62 
The Circuit Court reasoned that patents are property subject to the 
protections of the Due Process Clause and Congress’s objective in enacting the 
PRA was permissible because it sought to prevent states from depriving patent 
owners of property without due process.63  Affirming the District Court, the 
Circuit Court held Congress may abrogate a state’s sovereign immunity under 
the Eleventh Amendment, only when Congress has both unequivocally 
expressed its intent to abrogate immunity, and acted pursuant to a valid 
exercise of authority. 64  Congress had revised the statutory language of the 
PRA, in response to the Circuit Court’s decision in Chew,65 to unequivocally 
express its intent to abrogate state sovereign immunity.66 
In determining that Congress did have the power to abrogate states’ 
sovereign immunity, the Circuit Court cited both Seminole Tribe67 and 
Fitzpatrick,68 stating that the Fourteenth Amendment “fundamentally altered 
the balance of state and federal power struck by the Constitution.”69  Section 
five of the Fourteenth Amendment grants Congress the power to enforce the 
prohibitions of section one “by appropriate legislation.”70  Congress may use 
any rational means to effectuate the substantive provisions of the 
amendments.71 
 
 60. See College Sav. Bank, 148 F.3d at 1346. 
 61. Id. at 1346. 
 62. Id. at 1345. 
 63. Id. at 1349-50. 
 64. See Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 55. 
 65. 893 F.2d at 331. 
 66. See College Sav. Bank, 148 F.3d at 1347.  See also 35 U.S.C. §§ 271(h), 296 (1994). 
 67. 517 U.S. at 59. 
 68. 427 U.S. at 455. 
 69. See College Sav. Bank, 148 F.3d at 1348. 
 70. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. 
 71. See College Sav. Bank, 148 F.3d at 1348. 
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The Circuit Court also required a showing of proportionality between the 
injury to be prevented or remedied and the means adopted to that end.72  State 
patent infringement causes considerable harm to the patentee and to the patent 
system as a whole.73  Abrogation of state sovereign immunity, however, 
subjects states to no greater burdens than those that must be endured by private 
parties.74  Therefore, the PRA was found to meet the required congruence 
between the harm to be prevented and the means selected to accomplish those 
ends.75 
IV. ANALYSIS 
A. Majority Opinion 
Chief Justice Rehnquist announced the judgment of the Court and 
delivered an opinion joined by Justices O’Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, and 
Thomas.76  The United States Supreme Court reversed the decision of the 
Circuit Court, thereby holding that Congress’s abrogation of states’ sovereign 
immunity through the PRA is unconstitutional and invalid.77  The PRA can not 
be sustained as legislation enacted to enforce the guarantees of the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s Due Process Clause.78 
1. Eleventh Amendment - States Right to Sovereign Immunity 
The Eleventh Amendment provides: “[t]he Judicial Power of the United 
States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced 
or prosecuted against one of the United States by citizens of another State, or 
by citizens or subjects of any Foreign State.”79  The Court interpreted the 
Eleventh Amendment as early as the 1890’s to mean that each state is a 
sovereign entity in our federal system, and “it is inherent in the nature of 
sovereignty not to be amenable to the suit of an individual without its 
consent.”80 
In determining if Congress validly enacted the PRA to abrogate states’ 
sovereign immunity, the Court agrees with the two requirements set forth by 
the Circuit Court.81  First, whether congress has unequivocally expressed its 
 
 72. Id. at 1353.  The circuit court held that if the means and ends lacked proportionality, then 
the legislation may become substantive in operation and effect.  Id. 
 73. Id. at 1354. 
 74. Id. at 1355. 
 75. Id. 
 76. See College Sav. Bank, 119 S. Ct. at 2201. 
 77. Id. at 2202. 
 78. Id. 
 79. U.S. CONST. amend. XI. 
 80. See Hans, 134 U.S. at 13. 
 81. See College Sav. Bank, 119 S. Ct. at 2205. 
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intent to abrogate the immunity; and second, whether Congress has acted 
pursuant to a valid exercise of power.82  The Court agreed with the findings of 
the Circuit Court in that Congress had made its intention to abrogate state 
sovereign immunity via the PRA unmistakably clear.83  The PRA provides 
“any state. . .shall not be immune, under the eleventh amendment of the 
Constitution of the United States or under any other doctrine of Sovereign 
immunity, from suit in federal court. . .for infringement of a patent.”84 
The Court then turns to the question of whether Congress has the power to 
compel a State to surrender its sovereign immunity.  Congress asserted it had 
the power to enact the PRA pursuant to three sources of constitutional 
authority: the Patent Clause,85 the Interstate Commerce Clause,86 and section 
five of the Fourteenth Amendment.87 
2. U.S. Const. Article One: The Patent Clause and the Interstate 
Commerce Clause 
The Court, in Seminole Tribe. held that Congress may not abrogate state 
sovereign immunity pursuant to its Article One powers.88  Therefore, the PRA 
can not be sustained as a valid abrogation under either the Interstate Commerce 
Clause or the Patent Clause.89 
3. The Fourteenth Amendment Due Process 
Congress retains the authority to abrogate state sovereign immunity 
pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment.90  But the legislation must be 
“appropriate” under section five of the Fourteenth Amendment.91  Appropriate 
legislation requires that there be a congruence and proportionality between the 
injury to be prevented and the means adopted to that end.92  For Congress to 
invoke section five, it must identify conduct transgressing the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s substantive provisions, and must tailor its legislation to remedy 
such conduct.93 
 
 82. Id. (citing Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 55). 
 83. Id.  The Court stated Congress’s intent could not be any clearer. 
 84. 35 U.S.C. § 296(a) (1994). 
 85. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
 86. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. 
 87. See College Sav. Bank, 119 S. Ct. at 2205. 
 88. See Seminole Tribe, 517 US at 72-73. 
 89. Id. 
 90. See College Sav. Bank, 119 S. Ct. at 2205. 
 91. City of Borne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 518-19 (1997) (the Court emphasized that 
Congress’ enforcement power is remedial in nature, but that legislation may be constitutional 
even though it intrudes into legislative spheres of authority previously reserved for the states). 
 92. See College Sav. Bank, 119 S. Ct. at 2207. 
 93. Id. 
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The underlying conduct at issue here is state infringement of patents and 
the use of sovereign immunity by states to deny patent owners a remedy for the 
infringement of their patent rights.94  The conduct of unremedied patent 
infringement by states must give rise to the Fourteenth Amendment violation 
that Congress sought to remedy in the PRA.95 
In enacting the PRA, Congress failed to identify any pattern of patent 
infringement by states.96  The House Report identified only two examples of 
patent suits against states, and the Circuit Court identified only eight patent-
infringement suits prosecuted against the states in the past 110 years.97  The 
Court found that Congress acted to prevent the speculative harm that patent 
infringement by states might increase in the future, and not to remedy an 
existing pattern of patent infringements by states without providing due 
process to the patent owner.98 
For Congress to have authority to enact the Patent Remedy Act pursuant to 
the Fourteenth Amendment, Congress must find that a state has deprived a 
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.99  The Court 
determined that deprivation by state action of a constitutionally protected 
interest is not in itself unconstitutional, it becomes unconstitutional when the 
deprivation is without due process of law.100  A state’s infringement of a 
patent, though interfering with a patent owner’s right to exclude others, does 
not by itself violate the constitution.101  A deprivation of property without due 
process only results where a state provides no remedy, or only inadequate 
remedies, to injured patent owners.102 
The Court determined that Congress did not find that state remedies were 
constitutionally inadequate, but that they were less convenient than federal 
remedies for purposes of uniformity.103  Aggrieved parties, in the state of 
Florida, may pursue either a legislative remedy through a claims bill104 or a 
judicial remedy through a takings or conversion claim.105  The need for 
uniformity in patent law is important, but that is a factor that should be 
addressed under the Article One Patent Powers rather than in a determination 
 
 94. Id. 
 95. Id. 
 96. Id. 
 97. Id. 
 98. College Sav. Bank, 119 S. Ct. at 2208. 
 99. Id. 
 100. Id. (quoting Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 125 (1990)). 
 101. College Sav. Bank, 119 S. Ct. at 2207. 
 102. Id. 
 103. Id. at 2209. 
 104. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 11.065  (West 1997). 
 105. See Jacobs Wind Elec. Co. v. Florida Dep’t of Transp., 626 So.2d 1333 (Fla. 1993). 
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of whether state sovereign immunity deprives a patentee of property without 
due process.106 
The Court focuses on Congress’s failure to identify a pattern of 
constitutional violations, holding that the lack of such a pattern causes the 
provisions of the PRA to be out of proportion to proposed remedial object.107  
Therefore, the PRA can not be understood as responsive to, or designed to 
remedy, unconstitutional behavior.108 
The PRA subjects states to an unlimited range of liability, because 
Congress failed to limit the coverage of the PRA to cases involving 
constitutional violations.109  As a means to meet the proportionality 
requirement, the Court identified three potential limitations to the Act:  (1) 
limiting the Act’s coverage to cases where a state refuses to offer any state-
court remedy for patent owners whose patents it had infringed; (2) confining 
the reach of the Act by limiting the remedy to certain types of infringement, 
such as non-negligent or infringement authorized pursuant to state policy; or 
(3) only providing for suits against states with questionable remedies or a high 
incidence of infringement.110 
4. The Fifth Amendment:  “Takings” Claim 
The Court did not consider whether Congress could validly abrogate state 
sovereign immunity pursuant its authority under the Just Compensation Clause 
of the Fifth Amendment because Congress failed to expressly invoke its 
authority under the clause.111 
B. Dissenting Opinion 
Justice Stevens filed the dissenting opinion, with whom Justices Souter, 
Ginsburg, and Breyer joined.112  The dissenting Justices believe that 
Congress’s abrogation of states’ sovereign immunity via the PRA was 
constitutional.113  The PRA should be sustained as valid legislation enacted to 
enforce the guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause.114 
The dissent emphasizes the fact that the Constitution grants Congress 
plenary authority over patents and copyrights.115  Congress granted the federal 
 
 106. See College Sav. Bank, 119 S. Ct. at 2209. 
 107. Id. at 2210. 
 108. Id. 
 109. Id. 
 110. Id. 
 111. See College Sav. Bank, 119 S. Ct. at 2208. 
 112. Id. at 2201. 
 113. Id. at 2211. 
 114. Id. 
 115. Id.  (citing U. S. CONST.  art. I, § 8, cl. 8). 
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courts with exclusive jurisdiction over patent infringement litigation.116  In 
1992, Congress enacted the PRA to unambiguously authorize patent 
infringement actions against states or state agencies.117  The dissent asserts that 
the absence of effective state remedies supports the conclusion that the PRA 
was an appropriate exercise of Congress’s power under section five of the 
Fourteenth Amendment to prevent state infringements of patents without due 
process of law.118 
1. Policy Requires National Uniformity - Governed By Federal Law 
The dissent asserts that Congress’s Article One “Patent Power” is directly 
relevant to this case because it establishes the constitutionality of the 
congressional decision to grant exclusive jurisdiction over patent infringement 
cases in the federal courts.119  While the Court acknowledges the need for 
uniformity in patent law is important, the Court discounts its significance as 
merely a factor to consider in the “Article I patent-power calculus” and refuses 
to consider it in the determination of whether sovereign immunity deprives a 
patentee of property without due process of law.120  The dissent disagrees and 
asserts that Congress had the authority to vest exclusive jurisdiction in the 
federal courts as well as to abrogate states’ sovereign immunity to federal court 
jurisdiction.121 
Supporting the need for national uniformity, the dissent asserts that there is 
a strong federal interest in promoting the “constitutional goals of stimulating 
invention and rewarding the disclosure of novel and useful advances of 
technology.”122  Patent litigation often raises difficult technical issues that are 
unfamiliar to the average trial judge.123  Inconsistent application of the patent 
laws has lead to undue forum shopping and unsettling inconsistency in patent 
adjudications. 124 
 
 116. Id. (citing Campbell v. Haverhill, 155 U.S. 610, 620 (1895)). 
 117. PRA, supra note 1. 
 118. See College Sav. Bank, 119 S. Ct. at 2211. 
 119. Id. at 2213. 
 120. Id. 
 121. Id. (the Dissent argues that the decision to vest exclusive jurisdiction over patent 
infringement cases in federal court was appropriate, and that it was equally appropriate for 
Congress to abrogate state sovereign immunity in patent infringement cases in order to close a 
loophole in the uniform federal scheme). 
 122. Id. at 2212 (citing Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Crafts Boats, Inc, 489 U.S. 141, 162-
163 (1989) (stating for the proposition that federal interests are threatened by inadequate 
protections of patents.  Therefore, uniformity, consistency, and familiarity with the patent 
jurisprudence are matters of overriding significance). 
 123. College Sav. Bank, 119 S. Ct. at 2211. 
 124. Id. 
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2. The PRA Was a Valid Exercise of Congress’s Fourteenth Amendment 
Enforcement Power 
The dissent believes that the PRA is a valid exercise of Congress’s 
Fourteenth Amendment enforcement power because it meets the test set forth 
in Flores.125  Congress has met the required congruence and proportionality 
between the injury to be prevented or remedied and the means adapted to that 
end.126  The dissent disagrees with the constitutional distinction that the 
majority draws between negligent and intentional patent infringement.127  
Respondent CSB has alleged that the Florida Board’s infringement was 
willful.128  Therefore, the question presented in this case is whether the PRA, 
which clarified Congress’s unmistakable intent to subject state infringers to 
federal court jurisdiction, may be applied to willful infringers. 129 
The dissent believes that, prior to this case, no requirement existed for 
Congress to identify a pattern of wide spread constitutional violations by the 
states.130  The majority based its opinion on perceived deficiencies in the 
evidence reviewed by Congress before enacting the legislation.131  Based upon 
this perceived lack of evidence, the majority held the PRA unconstitutional 
because Congress failed to identify a pattern of infringement by the states.132  
The dissent finds the legislative record to have sufficient evidence of 
constitutional violations by states because Congress heard testimony about 
inadequate state remedies for patent infringement when considering the 
PRA.133  Congress also heard general testimony that state remedies would 
likely be insufficient to compensate patentees whose patents were infringed by 
states.134  The legislative record referenced several cases of patent infringement 
 
 125. Id. at 2213.  See also Flores, 521 U.S. at 520 (The Flores proportionality test is 
essentially: “There must be a congruence and proportionality between the injury to be prevented 
or remedied and the means adopted to that end. Lacking such a connection, legislation may 
become substantive in operation and effect.”). 
 126. College Sav. Bank, 119 S. Ct. at 2213. 
 127. Id. (the dissent disagrees with the majority’s rationale that patent infringement is 
analogous to the holding in Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 332-34 (1986), where the court 
found mere negligence in a personal injury case did not deprive anyone of liberty without due 
process of law). 
 128. Id. 
 129. Id. at 2212.  See Bonito Boats, 489 U.S. at 162-63. 
 130. College Sav. Bank, 119 S. Ct. at 2217. 
 131. Id. at 2214. 
 132. Id. at 2210. 
 133. Id. at 2214. 
 134. Id. at 2215 (the legislative record references several cases of patent infringement 
involving states, see e.g., Paperless Accounting, Inc. v. Mass Transit Admin., Civil No. HAR 84-
2922 (D. Md. 1985) (cited in House Hearing, at 56); Hercules, Inc. v. Minnesota States Highway 
Dep’t, 337 F. Supp. 795 (Minn. 1972) (House Hearing, at 51)). 
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involving states, including Chew.135  The dissent believes that the decision in 
Chew clearly supports Congress’s authority to enact the PRA because the 
Federal Court did not require a determination of whether a patent owner had 
any remedy in state court.136 
Congress determined that state infringement of patents was likely to 
increase.137  The dissent provides several examples where States, especially 
state universities, have been involved in patent cases since 1992.138 
The dissent finds it ironic that the Court would require Congress to review 
the remedies available in each state for patent infringements, since Congress 
had already preempted state jurisdiction over patent infringement.139  It is 
reasonable for Congress to assume that such remedies simply did not exist. 140 
3. Congress’s Fourteenth Amendment Enforcement Powers are 
Preventive, Not Merely Remedial 
The dissent finds Congress had sufficient evidence of actual or potential 
constitutional violations to meet the standard set forth in Flores, that Congress 
has authority to enact appropriate enforcement legislation under the Fourteenth 
Amendment to “remedy or prevent” unconstitutional actions.141  The dissent 
does not agree with the majority’s attempt to restate the standard to allow for 
remedial legislation only.142  In Flores, the Court merely restated the principle 
that Congress’s enforcement power encompasses legislation that both deters 
and remedies constitutional violations, even if it prohibits conduct that is not 
unconstitutional and intrudes into areas of autonomy previously reserved for 
the states.143  The dissent distinguishes the PRA from the Religion Freedom 
Restoration Act (RFRA).  The dissent asserts the PRA is remedial legislation, 
as opposed to an attempt by Congress to substantively change the Court’s 
interpretation of the Constitution.  The RFRA was struck down because it was 
an attempt by Congress to usurp the Supreme Court’s authority to interpret the 
United States Constitution.144 
 
 135. College Sav. Bank, 119 S. Ct. at 2214 (referring to Chew, 893 F.2d at  331). 
 136. College Sav. Bank, 119 S. Ct. at 2214. 
 137. Id. at 2215. 
 138. See, e.g., University of Colo. Foundation, Inc. v. American Cyanamid Co., 974 F. Supp. 
1339 (Colo. 1997) (patent infringement action filed by University of Colorado); Genentech v. 
Regents of Univ. of Cal., 143 F.3d 1446 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (declaratory judgement suit filed by 
Genentech); and Ciba-Geigy v. Alza Corp., 804 F. Supp 614 (N.J. 1992) (counterclaim brought 
by Alza Corp. against Regents of University of California). 
 139. College Sav. Bank, 119 S. Ct. at 2216. 
 140. Id. 
 141. Id. at 2217. 
 142. Id. 
 143. Id. 
 144. Id. (citing Flores, 521 U.S. at 525 (the Court held Congress’s Fourteenth Amendment 
enforcement power is corrective or preventive, not definitional)). 
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In contrast to the majority, the dissent finds precise congruence between 
the means used (abrogation of state sovereign immunity in patent infringement 
cases) and the ends to be achieved (elimination of the risk that the defense of 
sovereign immunity will deprive some patentees of property without due 
process of the law).145  The congruence is precise regardless if the infringement 
of patents by states is rare or infrequent.146  If infringements are rare, then the 
statute will only operate in those infrequent cases.147  But if a pattern of 
infringement were to develop, then the impact of the statute will expand in 
harmony with the growth of the problem that Congress is attempting to 
prevent.148  Under either scenario, the PRA will have no impact on states’ 
enforcement of their laws.149  As a result, the dissent asserts that the PRA puts 
states in the same position as all private users of the patent system, and 
virtually the same position as the United States.150 
C. Author’s Analysis 
1. States May Deprive Patent Owners of Their Property Without Due 
Process of Law 
As a result of the Court’s decision in FPP, patent owners may have no 
protection against state infringement of their patents.151  State sovereign 
immunity provided by the Eleventh Amendment prevents a patent owner from 
filing suit against a state in federal court.152  Currently, the patentee may be 
deprived of property without due process unless the state has voluntarily 
submitted to federal jurisdiction or the state has provided for a state remedy.153  
If states fail to provide one of the above remedies, then a patent owner has no 
remedy against state infringement until Congress enacts new legislation that 
abrogates the state’s sovereign immunity. 
2. Congress’s Power to Enact Appropriate Enforcement Legislation 
Under Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment is Severely Limited 
The Court has severely limited Congress’s ability to enforce the 
substantive provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment.154  By requiring 
 
 145. College Sav. Bank, 119 S. Ct. at 2218. 
 146. Id. 
 147. Id. 
 148. Id. 
 149. Id. 
 150. College Sav. Bank, 119 S. Ct. at 2218. 
 151. Id. the Court struck down the PRA as an unconstitutional attempt by Congress to 
abrogate state sovereign immunity. 
 152. U.S. CONST. amend. XI. 
 153. See College Sav. Bank, 119 S. Ct. at 2204. 
 154. See generally id. at 2211-18. 
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appropriate legislation to be “remedial” versus preventive in nature, the Court 
has handicapped Congress’s power to protect individual’s constitutional 
rights.155  Section five of the Fourteenth Amendment authorizes Congress to 
enact all “appropriate”156 legislation to enforce the substantive provisions of 
section one of the Fourteenth Amendment.157  The express language of the 
Fourteenth Amendment does not limit appropriate legislation to remedial 
only.158  Over the years, the phrase “appropriate legislation” has been subject 
to judicial interpretation.  Initially, the Court’s interpretation provided a 
broader definition159 of “appropriate legislation,” but the recent trend has been 
to narrow the scope of appropriate legislation to remedial only.160  The Court 
in FPP has narrowed its interpretation further by requiring Congress to identify 
a “pattern” of widespread and persisting constitutional violations as a 
prerequisite for appropriate legislation.161  Although language of this type has 
been used in prior Court decisions,162 it has never been a prerequisite to 
appropriate legislation.163 
The Court is creating new jurisprudence by requiring Congress to identify 
widespread and pervasive constitutional violations as a prerequisite to 
appropriate legislation.164  Citing Scanlon, the dissent asserted that the only 
requirement previously placed upon Congress to enact appropriate 
enforcement legislation was that Congress make its intention to abrogate 
states’ sovereign immunity “unmistakably clear.”165  But, in that case the Court 
struck down the legislation as inappropriate legislation under section five of 
 
 155. Id. 
 156. THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY 192 (Second College ed. 1985) (defines 
“appropriate” as “suitable for a particular person, condition, occasion, or place; proper; fitting”). 
 157. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. 
 158. Id.  (the statutory language only requires that legislation be “appropriate”, not remedial). 
 159. See Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 345-46 (1879) (holding that any legislation enacted 
to ensure compliance with the Fourteenth Amendment and to provide equality of civil rights is 
appropriate under the enforcement clause).  The Court also observed that the Fourteenth 
Amendment was intended to be a limitation of the power of states and enlargements of the power 
of Congress.  Id. 
 160. See South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 326 (1966) (holding that in order to 
enforce the provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment congressional action must be construed as 
“remedial”). 
 161. See College Sav. Bank, 119 S. Ct. at 2210 (striking down the PRA because it did not 
respond to a history of “widespread and persisting deprivation of constitutional rights” as 
required to enact proper prophylactic Fourteenth Amendment legislation). 
 162. See Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at 301 (The Court upheld the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 
noting evidence in the record of subsisting and pervasive discrimination amounting to 
constitutional violations). 
 163. See id. at 333-34 (the Court, however, did not require widespread and pervasive 
discrimination as a prerequisite to enacting appropriate legislation). 
 164. See College Sav. Bank, 119 S. Ct. at 2217. 
 165. Id. at 2214 (citing Scanlon, 473 U.S. at 247). 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
502 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY PUBLIC LAW REVIEW [Vol. 19:485 
the Fourteenth.166  One deficiency with the dissent’s argument, is that once the 
Court determined that the legislation failed the unmistakably clear intention 
doctrine,167 the Court was not required to analyze other required elements. 
Requiring Congress to identify a pattern of constitutional violations will 
cause Fourteenth Amendment enforcement legislation to become more costly 
and time consuming.  For future legislation to be upheld, Congress will be 
required to investigate and document a pattern of constitutional violations in 
the legislative record to prevent appropriate Fourteenth Amendment legislation 
from being struck down.168  Congress may only effectuate laws against state 
patent infringers that do not provide state remedies or only provide inadequate 
remedies.  Therefore, the new requirement will prevent Congress from 
enacting legislation enforceable against all states.169 
The new requirement preempts Congress from establishing a Uniform 
National Patent Policy that provides consistent protections against both private 
and state patent infringement.  Because Congress may only abrogate states’ 
sovereign immunity after finding a history of infringement without due 
process, states that provide minimal state remedies for state infringements may 
protect their right to sovereign immunity.  Although the Court states that a 
finding of inadequate state remedies would enable Congress to abrogate state 
sovereign immunity,170 the Court fails to provide standards or examples of 
inadequate State remedies.171  The lack of such standards leads to the 
conclusion that any state remedy will be sufficient to protect the state from 
abrogation of its sovereign immunity, or at least make it less likely that the 
Court will uphold such an abrogation. 
3. Despite the Court’s opinion, Congress Should Not be Required to 
Identify a Pattern of Constitutional Violations as a Prerequisite to 
Enacting Fourteenth Amendment Legislation 
The Separation of Powers Doctrine provides the Supreme Court exclusive 
authority to interpret the United States Constitution,172 while it empowers 
Congress to enact appropriate legislation to enforce the Supreme Court’s 
 
 166. See Scanlon, 473 U.S. at 247. 
 167. Id. 
 168. See College Sav. Bank, 119 S. Ct. at 2207 (the PRA was struck down because the 
legislative record only identified two examples of patent infringement suits against states). 
 169. Id. (stating where adequate state remedies are provided and followed, no deprivation of 
property without due process may result). 
 170. Id. 
 171. Id. at 2207-8. 
 172. Marybury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137, 5 U.S. 137 (1803). 
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interpretation of the Constitution.173  In Flores, the Court reaffirmed the 
Doctrine by declaring the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA)174 an 
unconstitutional attempt by Congress to expand the substantive provisions of 
the Fourteenth Amendment.175  Congress enacted RFRA, in direct response to 
the Supreme Court’s holding in Employment Div. v. Smith, as an attempt to 
overrule the Court’s interpretation of the Constitution.176  One of Congress’s 
stated purposes for enacting the RFRA was to restore the compelling-interest 
test177 that prohibited a state government from substantially burdening a 
person’s exercise of religion unless the government could demonstrate that the 
burden was in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest.178  The Court 
struck down the RFRA because if Congress could define its own powers by 
altering the Court’s interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment, then the 
Constitution would no longer be “superior paramount law, unchangeable by 
ordinary legislative means.”179 
In contrast to the RFRA, Congress’s enactment of the PRA was not an 
attempt to usurp the Judicial Branch’s authority to interpret the Constitution.180  
Congress passed the PRA as remedial legislation to protect patent owners’ 
rights from being deprived without due process of law.181  The Court has 
interpreted the Constitution holding that patent infringement by states without 
providing a remedy equates to a Constitutional violation under the Fourteenth 
Amendment.182  Therefore, Congress has the authority to enact appropriate 
legislation to prevent such deprivations of property without due process of 
law.183 
Despite the Court’s decision in FPP, Congress should not be required to 
identify a pattern of constitutional violations before it can enact appropriate 
 
 173. Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 651 (1966) (stating it is for Congress to 
“determine whether and what legislation is needed to secure the guarantees of the Fourteenth 
Amendment,” and its conclusions are entitled to much deference). 
 174. 42 U.S.C. § 2000(b)(b) (1998). 
 175. See generally Flores, 521 U.S. at 507. 
 176. Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990) (holding that under the free exercise 
clause, neutral laws of general applicability may be applied to religious practices even when not 
supported by a compelling governmental interest). 
 177. See Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963).  The Supreme Court applied a compelling-
interest test for purposes of determining whether a governmental regulation violated the Federal 
Constitution’s First Amendment Clause.  In applying the test, the court asked: (1) whether the 
regulation substantially burdens a religious practice; and (2) if so, whether the burden was 
justified by a compelling interest.  Id. 
 178. See Flores, 521 U.S. at 515-16. 
 179. Id. at 529. 
 180. See College Sav. Bank, 119 S. Ct. at 2218 (the dissent argues it merely effectuates settled 
federal policy to confine patent infringement litigation to federal judges). 
 181. Id. 
 182. Id. at 2208 (citing Zinermon, 494 U.S. at 125). 
 183. See Morgan, 384 U.S. at 651. 
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legislation.  The new requirement will have the effect of requiring several 
patent owners to be deprived of property rights without due process of law.  
Since the Court has already decided that state infringement of patents without 
due process is a Constitutional violation,184 Congress should be empowered to 
ensure that all patent owners are guaranteed a remedy for such a violation and 
not just those patent owners that are fortunate to have their patents infringed 
after a widespread pattern of constitutional violations has occurred.  States 
should not be allowed to infringe on private patents without providing some 
form of remedy.  It is illogical to require that several individuals have their 
constitutional rights violated before Congress may enact legislation to prevent 
such violations. 
4. Where Does Congress Go From Here? 
Congress must revise the PRA to meet the three requirements of 
appropriate Fourteenth Amendment legislation, as set forth in FPP:  (1) 
Congress must identify a pattern of constitutional violations; (2) it must 
express its intent to abrogate sovereign immunity with unmistakable clarity; 
and (3) the means selected must be proportionate to ends.185  The Court has 
failed to provide Congress with clear guidance on how to fulfill the first and 
third requirements. 
In regard to the first requirement, the Court has failed to quantify the 
number of constitutional violations that Congress must identify before the 
deprivation equates to a “pattern” of constitutional violations.  In FPP, the 
Court struck down the PRA even though it acknowledged that Congress 
identified at least two incidents of constitutional violations.186  From the 
Court’s decision in FPP, Congress can infer that a substantial number of 
violations must occur before the Court will find that a “pattern” of 
unconstitutional patent infringements has occurred.  The ambiguity associated 
with the Court’s interpretation of a “pattern” of constitutional violations may 
prevent Congress from enacting any patent regulation legislation pursuant to it 
Fourteenth Amendment enforcement power. 
In regard to the third element, the Court provided three recommendations 
of ways Congress could limit the statute so that the means selected by 
Congress were proportionate to its ends.187  Of the three recommended 
limitations, only the first recommendation appears practical without further 
explanation by the Court.188  Congress could easily limit the Act’s coverage to 
 
 184. See College Sav. Bank, 119 S.Ct. at 2208. 
 185. Id. at 2206-07. 
 186. Id. at 2207. 
 187. See supra text accompanying note 110. 
 188. See supra text accompanying note 110 (the Court’s first recommendation was for 
Congress to limit the Act’s coverage to cases where a state refuses to offer any state-court remedy 
for patent owners whose patents it had infringed). 
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cases where a state refuses to offer any state-court remedy.  One advantage to a 
limitation of this type is that it could be incorporated into the statutory 
language without requiring Congress to perform an exhaustive investigation 
into the types of remedies available in each state. 
The other two recommendations do not appear to be practical without 
further clarification because the Court has not articulated standards by which 
such legislation would be upheld.189  For example, Congress cannot provide for 
suits against only those states with questionable remedies, without the Court 
first defining the types of remedies that are acceptable versus questionable.  
Similarly, the Court has also failed to define what equals a high incidence of 
infringement. 
Based upon the Court’s interpretation of the three requirements in FPP, it 
appears unlikely that Congress will enact any appropriate patent legislation 
under the Fourteenth Amendment against states that provide a state remedy of 
any type.  Thus, many private patent owners that have their patents infringed 
by states may not be provided any due process, or at best may receive state due 
process that is often illusory. 
Although the PRA has been held an unconstitutional abrogation of state 
sovereign immunity under Article One and under the Fourteenth Amendment, 
the Court has not yet decided if it would be upheld as a valid exercise of 
Congress’ Fifth Amendment “Takings” clause power.190  Upon a general 
review of the issue it appears that any attempt to ground the PRA in the 
Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment will fail. 
The Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment requires that states pay just 
compensation when property is taken for a public purpose pursuant to a state’s 
power of eminent domain.191  In general terms, the Court will authorize a 
taking when a state justly compensates a private individual for state 
deprivation of his property, and the deprivation was for a public purpose.192  
The Court will only find a taking if the state action causes a drastic reduction 
in the value of the property193 or a permanent physical occupation by the state 
exists.194  Since it would be difficult for a patent owner to prove a drastic 
reduction in the value of his property or an analogy to a permanent physical 
occupation, the Court would probably not uphold the PRA under a Fifth 
 
 189. See supra text accompanying note 110  (the Court’s other two recommendations were: 
(1) for Congress to confine the reach of the Act by limiting the remedy to certain types of 
infringement, such as non-negligent or infringement authorized pursuant to state policy; or (2) for 
Congress to only provide for suits against states with questionable remedies or a high incidence 
of infringement). 
 190. See College Sav. Bank, 119 S. Ct. at 2208. 
 191. U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
 192. Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1000-04  (1984). 
 193. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922). 
 194. Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982). 
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Amendment Takings analysis.  The Court would probably find patent 
infringement more similar to regulation of property that does not require just 
compensation.  Associate Professor Thomas Cotter and Christina Bohannan 
have considered the Constitutionality of the PRA under the Fifth Amendment 
and assert that it can not be upheld as valid Fifth Amendment legislation 
pursuant to the Takings Clause.195  Since Congress’ purpose in enacting the 
PRA is to prevent states from making unlawful uses of patents, it is difficult to 
perceive how Congress could forbid the states from effecting takings of 
intellectual property and, at the same time, claim that it is enforcing the 
Takings clause, which allows the states to effect takings upon payment of just 
compensation.196 
5. The Courts’ Trend Toward Restricting Federal Power 
The broader significance of FPP is the radically new and restricted view of 
federal power.  When considered with the restrictions placed upon Article I by 
Seminole Tribe, FPP represents the view of a 5-Justice majority that federal 
power is much less extensive than had previously been thought.  As Professor 
Tribe has said, “the Court’s current dedication to a states’ rights doctrine seems 
to be a free floating cloud that can rain on almost any source of Congressional 
power.”197 
ROBERT G. BRANDT 
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